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RULES 
Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5, 6, 7 
Rule 52 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4,10 
Rule 60 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 6, 8 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Defendant's appeal of the trial court's order vacating the summary judgment 
order in favor of the Defendant is not proper as Defendant's underlying motion for 
summary judgment was never properly served on the Plaintiff. The Defendant attempted 
to file a summary judgment motion on December 13, 2004, in the Fifth Judicial District 
but the case had not yet been transferred to the Fifth District. The Fifth District Court 
returned the motion to the Defendant unfiled as it had no case pending for the Defendant 
with that civil number. The Plaintiff then moved the Third District Court to change venue 
to the Fifth District Court, and that motion was granted in February of 2005. 
The Defendant then re-filed the same summary judgment motion which had been 
previously returned by the Fifth District Court, but failed to serve the motion on the 
Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant's motion was not properly before the court as Plaintiff 
was not properly served with Defendant's April 26, 2005, summary judgment motion. 
3 
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2. It was not reversible error for the trial court to vacate the order of judgment in 
favor of the Defendant. The trial court is granted broad discretion in ruling on URCP 
60(b) motions. The Defendant argues that the trial court used the wrong standard, but the 
record is silent as to what standard the trial court used. Therefore, any claim that the 
wrong standard was used is presumptive and speculative. 
3. The trial court correctly confirmed the arbitration award according to the 
applicable statutory scheme. The Plaintiff filed a motion to confirm an arbitration award 
and the Defendant did not file his motion to vacate the award within the specified 90 
days. The Defense argues that the trial court should not have entered judgment without 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, citing URCP 52. URCP 52 is not applicable when 
confirming an arbitration award because the arbitration award is confirmed by operation 
of statute, not a trial. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEFENDANT IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE AS 
DEFENDANT'S UNDERLYING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY 
SERVED UPON THE PLAINTIFF. 
The Defendant's appeal of the Order Vacating Judgment in favor of the Defendant 
is fatally flawed as the underlying motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendant 
on April 26, 2005, was not properly served on the Plaintiff. Rule 5(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (URCP) states that "[a]ll papers after the complaint required to be 
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before or within a reasonable time 
after service." 
In this case, the Defendant attempted to file the summary judgment motion on 
December 13, 2004, in the Fifth District Court, but the motion was returned to the 
Defendant unfiled, as demonstrated by the crossed out time-stamps and admitted by the 
Defendant. (See Brief of Appellant, page 13 and Exhibit "A") While Plaintiff does not 
dispute the receipt of the Defendant's motion on December 15, 2004, the fact that it was 
returned to the Defendant, and not filed with the court for another 150 days worked to 
relieve Plaintiff from the obligation to respond to the motion for summary judgment at 
that time. 
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Plaintiff was not required to respond to the April 26,2005, motion for summary 
judgment as the Defendant did not comply with Rule 5(d) when he waited 150 days to 
actually file the motion with the Fifth District Court. The 150 day delay was clearly not 
"reasonable" under the meaning of Rule 5(d). Therefore, the summary judgment motion 
should not have been considered by the Fifth District Court, much less entered. 
II. IT WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT TO VACATE THE ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The trial court did not commit reversible error when it vacated the order of summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendant on September 7, 2005. The trial court has broad 
discretion in vacating judgments and final orders according to this Court's holding in 
Birch. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114. This Court also held that a trial court's decision 
regarding a URCP 60(b) motion "will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." 
Baker v. Western Surety Company, 757 P.2d 878, 881. 
In this case, the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
vacated the order of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant due to inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect. The Defense goes to great lengths to point out that the 
Plaintiff had been "constructively" served with the motion, and did not demonstrate a 
sufficient basis for the surprise or excusable neglect. What the Defendant fails to address, 
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is that the summary judgment motion was never properly served on the Plaintiff when it 
was filed. Defendant's filing of a summary judgment motion without notifying the 
Plaintiff clearly constituted surprise, and Plaintiffs failure to respond to the motion was 
excusable. 
The Defendant argues that Plaintiff was on notice that a summary judgment motion 
had been filed as Plaintiff had received the December 13,2004, motion for summary 
judgment on December 15, 2004. Under the holding in Airkem International, "[t]he 
movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from [acting] 
by circumstances beyond his control" to establish mistake inadvertence, or excusable 
neglect. Airkem International Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431. In this case, the 
Plaintiff was prevented from responding to April 26, 2005 summary judgment motion as 
Plaintiff did not receive notice that the motion had been filed. 
Plaintiff was also prevented from responding to the Defendant's December 13, 2004, 
motion for summary judgment as the Defendant did not actually file that motion in either 
the Fifth District Court or the Third District Court. The Defendant's failure to properly 
file the summary judgment motion on December 13,2004, relieved the Plaintiff of any 
obligation to reply to that motion according to Rule 5. Therefore, Plaintiff was prevented 
from filing a reply memorandum by circumstances outside his control, namely, the 
Defendant's failure to properly serve the motion for summary judgment. 
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A. DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD IS 
PRESUMPTIVE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The Defendant's claim that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in vacating 
the order of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant is presumptive and is not 
supported by the record. Defendant claims that the trial court applied the incorrect legal 
standard in reviewing Plaintiffs URCP 60(b) motion to vacate. (See Brief of Appellant, 
page 20) The Defendant argues that the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs motion to vacate 
did not satisfy the legal standard as stated in Airkem International discussed above. Id. 
The Defendant claims that the trial court used the wrong standard, but does not state 
which incorrect standard the trial court allegedly applied. 
It is presumptive for the Defendant to claim that the trial court used the wrong 
standard when the record is silent on what standard was used by the trial court. The 
record is silent as the trial court did not enter findings of facts or conclusions of law with 
the order vacating judgment. Therefore, the Defendant has no way of knowing what legal 
standard was used by the trial court and cannot claim that it used the wrong one. Under 
the broad discretion granted the trial court in Birch, this Court should leave the order 
vacating judgment intact as there is no indication on the record that the wrong legal 
standard was used. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114. 
8 
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HI. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONFIRMATION OF THE 
ARBITRATION AWARD SHOULD NOT BE VACATED 
AS THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW TO SUPPORT THE ORDER. 
The trial court was correct to confirm the arbitration award and the confirmation 
should not be vacated as the trial court was not required to enter findings of fact to 
support the confirmation of the award. According to UCA § 7 8-31(a) 123, the arbitration 
award "shall" be confirmed by the Court unless it should be vacated under UCA § 78-
31(a) 124. Therefore, a Defendant's proper course of action to attack an arbitration award 
is to file a motion to vacate the ward. UCA § 78-31(a) 124(2) states that any motion to 
vacate the award shall be filed within 90 days of the movant receiving notice of the 
award. 
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Babcock & Wilcox, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held, 
The sole issue to be decided on appeal is whether the affirmative defenses raised 
by B&W were time-barred, a question not previously decided by this circuit. We 
hold that the passing of the time limitation period for an action to vacate an 
arbitration award completely bars, in a subsequent confirmation proceeding, the 
raising of such statutory defenses. 
826 F.2d 962, 964 (1987). Therefore, a party objecting to an arbitration award who fails 
to file a motion to vacate an arbitration award in a timely manner is "completely" barred 
from raising the statutory defenses in a subsequent action to confirm the award. Id. 
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On March 26, 2005, the Defendant filed an objection to the arbitration award claiming 
that there was no agreement to arbitrate. (See Exhibit "B") That is a "statutory defense" 
listed in § 78-31 (a) 124. According to the holding in International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers v. Babcock and Wilcox, the Defendant cannot raise this statutory 
defense for the first time in the confirmation proceeding as the motion was not filed 
within 90 days of entry of the arbitration award in accordance with UCA § 78-31(a) 
124(2). Id 
The Defendant claims that the URCP 52(a) requires the trial court to enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to support the entry of a judgment. However, this action was 
not "tried upon the facts" as referred to in URCP 52, rather, the arbitration award was 
confirmed and entered as a judgment through a statutory process. Therefore, no findings 
of fact or conclusions of law are necessary to support the judgment and Defendant's 
argument must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, this Court should deny Defendant's appeal. 
Addendum is attached and includes copies of filings and papers. 
DATED: July 17, 2006 
j^_ 
Tefton J. Smith 
10 
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ADDENDUM 
i 
• 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
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cth 5m DISTRICT COURT IN WASHINGTON COUNTY UTAH 
MBNA AMERICA BANK N. A. 
ALLEGED ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
R. BRADLEY NEFF 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
DONN WILLIAMS 
Defendant Defendant's motion for Summa 
Case No. 0404JS 5^05 O ^ O S ^ ? ^ 
Brief in support 
Donn Williams moves this court for Summary Judgment in favor of Donn Williams. 
Affidavit 
I, Donn Williams, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own 
personal knowledge: 
1 - 1 am not in receipt of any document from the Plaintiff which verifies and validates the 
alleged debt in question as required through the Fair Debt Collections and Practices Act. 
2-1 have not received any requested information from Plaintiff MBNA America Bank 
N. A. and R. Bradley Neff which shows that they have appointed or hired Attorney R. 
Bradley Neff to represent them fully, and to sue in behalf of MBNA America Bank N.A. 
in the state of Utah. 
3 - 1 am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with MBNA 
America Bank N.A.. 
4 - 1 am not in receipt of any requested document which verifies that I owe MBNA 
America Bank N.A. money. 
5-1 have not agreed to any arbitration clause, as stated by Plaintiff, and have not received 
any document verifying and validating this alleged agreement. 
6-1 have not received any accounting nor General Ledger showing exact amounts owed 
and interest charged with respect to any final amount presented from MBNA America 
Bank N.A. and R Bradley Neff, and did not received a name of a competent Fact 
Witness as to the accounting and calculations in the above General Ledger. 
7 - 1 am not in receipt of any document which verifies and validates that MBNA America 
Bank N.A. authorized this action or is even aware of it. Based off of U.C.A. 16-10a-
1501(2)(a) and U.C.A. 16-10a-1501(2)(i) only MBNA America N.A. is allowed to seek 
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damages on their own behalf in the State of Utah, not through a 3rd party collector like R. 
Bradley Neff. 
8 - As a result of the harassment of R. Bradley Neff, I have been damaged financially, 
and socially, and emotionally. 
9-1 have received no answer to any of the inquires made to & Bradley Neff and MBNA 
America N. A., these inquires where sent by me by way of Certified mail and where 
received by R. Bradley Neff. 
10-1 am not in receipt of any document which verifies and validates that I have entered 
into any agreement with, or owe R Bradley Neff and or assigyS aay money. 
COUNTY OF txkshJA 
Donn Williams 
STATE OF OJ&L INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 OT5ofel4^ 
Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State on 
this jyfi^ day of/)&ft»fAv% 2004, personally appeared A * A U>IIIMX\S 
To me known to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing 
instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as his free and voluntary 
act. 
Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. 
My commission expires /jU\ CfZ}2JSO^ 
NOTARY PU6UC 
BRENT GRIFFITH 
40S100E 
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770 
COMMEX!»0eWD7 
STATE OF UTAH 
,/^^^h^ 
Memorandums of law 
Notary Public 
Memorandum oflaw in support of the point of law that arbitration clauses in 
contracts of adhesion are impermissible nnder the law and unenforceable. 
MBNA America Bank NA' s reliance on an arbitration clause in MBNA's contracts of 
adhesion is morally, ethically, and legally wrong. See Myers V. MBNA America and 
North American Capital Corporation, CV 00-163-MDWM (D. Mont., March 20,2001), 
Armendariz v. Found Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,690 (Cal. 2000), Circuit 
City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889,893 (9th Cir. 2002), (citing Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 138,145 (CtApp. 1997), Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 
1042 (9th Cir. 2001), Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1961), 
Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376,382( Ct. App. 2001), 
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862,867 (Ct. App. 2002), ACORN v. 
HouseholdInt% Inc., 211F. Supp. 2d 1160,1172(N.D. Cal. 2002), Mandelv. 
Household Bank, 2003 SL 57282, at *4(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 7,2003) (applying Nevada 
Law), Murcuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671,678 (Ct. App. 2002), Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20 (1991), In re: Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482, 
Shankle v. B-GMaint., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230,1235 (10th Cir. 1999), In re: Doctor's 
Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688, and Ting v. AT&T, NO. 02-15416 (9th Cir. Feb. 11,2003). 
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Plaintiff has not provided the requested evidence to establish a sufficient factual basis to 
survive the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Under the U.C. A. 78-3 la-124 
which states "that an arbitration award should be vacated if the court finds corruption, 
fraud, partiality on the part of the arbitrator, misconduct by the arbitrator, the arbitrator 
exceeded their authority, there was no agreement to arbitrate, or the arbitrator failed to 
give proper notice of the hearing." 
As stated, in the above, there was no agreement to arbitrate and no agreement has been 
presented by MBNA America N. A. and R. Bradley Neff. Also it must be noted that any 
arbitration done outside the State of Utah cannot have any jurisdiction for the Defendant 
who resides in the State of Utah unless agreed to. The Defendant has not agreed to 
arbitration done in the State of Delaware. The Defendant has not agreed to arbitration 
period. 
Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that party alleging to be creditor 
must prove standing 
MBNA America Bank N.A and Attorney R. Bradley Neff have failed or refused to 
produce the actual note, contract, agreement, which MBNA America Bank N.A. alleges 
Donn Williams owes. Where the complaining party cannot prove the existence of the 
note, contract, agreement then there is no note, contract, and agreement. To recover on a 
note, contract, agreement then the plaintiff must prove: 
(1) the existence of the note, contract, agreement in question; Under Federal guidelines of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) the Defendant has a right to see the note, contract, agreement 
and request the original FRCP- Rule 1002 Requirement of Original - "To prove the 
content of writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, record, or photograph, 
is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by act of Congress." FRCP-
Rule 1003 Admissibility of Duplicates - "A duplicate is admissible to the same extent 
as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original 
or (2) in this circumstance it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the 
original." Also under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCO Section 1-2-1(3) -
" Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by 
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or 
course of performance as provided in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 1-206). Whether and 
agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provisions of this Act, if 
applicable; otherwise by the Law of Contracts (Sectionsl-103). 
(2) That the party sued signed the note, contract, agreement; 
(3) That the plaintiff is the actual owner or holder of the note, contract, agreement; and 
(4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the note, contract, agreement, with proof of 
a general ledger and accounting showing exact balances owed and how they came up 
with the final figure. See in Re: SMS Financial LLC. K Abco Homes, Inc. No. 98-
50117 February 18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29 of the New Jersey 
Practice Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states,"...; and no part 
payments should be made on the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is 
made is able to produce the bond or note and the part payments are endorsed thereon. It 
would seem that the mortgagor would normally have a Common Law right to demand 
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production or surrender of the bond or note and mortgage as the case may be, (Common 
Law is also Valid Law in Utah as welU. See Restatement, Contracts S 170(3), (4) 
(1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469 in Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck 256 N. J. Super 23 (App. 
Div 1992), the Appellate Division Held, "When the underlying mortgage is evidenced by 
an instrument meeting the criteria for negotiability set forth in N J.S. 12A:3-104, the 
Holder of the instrument shall be afforded all the rights and protections provided a holder 
in due course pursuant to N J.S. 12A:3-302" Since no one is able to produce the 
"instrument" there is no competent evidence before the Court that any party is the holder 
of the alleged note or the true holder in due course. Common law dictates that the 
plaintiff prove the existence of the alleged note in question, prove that the party sued 
signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the alleged 
note, and prove that certain balance is due and owing on any alleged note. Federal Circuit 
Courts have ruled that the only way to prove the perfection of any security is by actual 
possession of the security. 
Questions that the court must answer: 
1 - Is MBNA America Bank N. A. the holder of the agreement in question? 
2 -Did MBNA America Bank N. A. have the right to sell the Agreement in question? 
3 -And, if sold are they no longer Collecting on the agreement in question? 
4 - Did the defendant agree to the sale of the agreement? 
5 - If Defendant did not enter into an agreement with R. Bradley Neff and R Bradley 
Neff refuses to give proof or Validate the debt in question, does he have the right to 
collect or is the Plaintiff and attorney committing fraud on the court by suing in behalf of 
someone no longer collecting on the debt and thus abusing Sections 808,809« and 812 of 
the Fair Debt Collections and Practices Act? 
6 - Can Attorney R. Bradley Neff speak for and behalf of MBNA America N. A., and be 
able to correct Defendant's credit report, and be able to render and delete items for and in 
behalf of MBNA America N. A. on all 3 major Credit Bureaus concerning matters 
relating to this dispute? 
See Matter oi Staff Mortg & Inv. Corp,, 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977), "Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the only notice sufficient to inform all interested parties that 
a security interest in instruments has been perfected is actual possession by the secured 
party, his agent or bailee." Bankruptcy Courts have followed the Uniform Commercial 
Code. In Re Investors & lenders, Ltd. 165 BR, 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N J. 1994), "Under the 
New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code (NJUCC), promissory note is "instrument," 
security interest in which must be perfected by possession ...". Credit Card agreements 
are also perfected by possession and must be agreed to by showing that both parties have 
agreed to the sale of such. 
Without the note, contract, agreement, none of the above questions can be answered or 
proven nor attested to. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be made by the Plaintiff and 
this court will lack venue to proceed. 
Memorandum of law in support of the point oflaw that to prove damages in 
foreclosures of a debt party must enter the account and general ledger statement 
into the record through a competent fact witness 
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To prove up claim of damages, foreclosing party must enter evidence incorporating 
records such as a general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid promissory note, 
contract, agreement, the person responsible for preparing and maintaining the account 
general ledger must provide a complete accounting which must be sworn to and dated by 
the person who maintained the ledger. See Pacific Concrete EC. U. v. Kauanoe, 62 
Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 R3d 807,96 
Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 
371, (Conn. Super.2000), and TownofBrookfieldv. CandlewoodShores Estates, Inc. 513 
A.2dl218, 201 ConnJ (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole, 163111 App. 3d845, 11411. 
Memorandum in support of the point of law that when jurisdiction is challenged, 
the party claiming that the court has jurisdiction has the legal burden to prove that 
jurisdiction was conferred upon the court through the proper procedure. Otherwise, 
the court is without jurisdiction. 
Whenever a party denies that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it becomes the 
duty and the burden of the party claiming that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to 
provide evidence from the record of the case that the court holds subject-matter 
jurisdictioa Bindellv. City of Harveyf 212 III. App. 3d 1042, 571 N.E. 2dl017(lstDisl 
1991) ("the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it."). 
Until Plaintiff and Attorney R. Bradley NefF submit uncontroversial evidence of subject-
matter jurisdiction to the court that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the court is 
proceeding without subject-matter jurisdictioa Loos v. American Energy Savers, Inc., 
168 III. App. 3d 558, 522 N. E2d841 (1988) ("Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden 
of establishing it rests upon the Plaintiff,"). 
The law places the duty and burden of subject-matter jurisdiction upon the Plaintiff and 
Attorney R. Bradley NefF. Should the Court attempt to place the burden upon the 
defendant, the court has acted against the Law, violates the Defendant's due process 
rights, and the Judge has immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Declaration 
Fifteen days from the verifiable receipt of this motion for summary judgment, an order 
shall be prepared and submitted to the court for ratification, unless prior to that time, 
MBNA America Bank N. A. presents a competent fact witness to rebut all articles- one 
through ten- of Donn Williams's affidavit, making their statements under penalty of 
perjury, supporting all the rebutted articles with^v^ences which would be admissible at 
trial, and sets the matter for hearing./^ $ 
Prepared and submitted by: 
fconn Williams 
Certificate of service 
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I, Donn Williams, certify that on y*c/Z 2004, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and forgoing motion for summary judgment via certified mail, return receipt 
requested to Bradley R. Neff, Attorney for Plaintiff. 
Donn Williams 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
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In the Fifth District Court Washington County, U$ 
MBNA America Bank, N. A. 
R. Bradley Neff 
Alleged Attorney for the Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Donn Williams \ / 
Case No. 040^505 O S ° 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS PETITION FOR ARBITRATION 
AWARD TO BE MADE INTO A JUDGEMENT 
Defendants motion to STRIKE the Arbitration Award presented by R, Bradley 
Neff. 
Brief in support 
Defendant has not entered into an agreement with MBNA America Bank, NA. No 
Contract has been entered into by defendant making defendant obligated into going to 
arbitration with plaintiff. Defendant has requested R. Bradley Neff, Wolpoffand 
AbramsonL.L.P.. Total Recovery USA Group. L.P. and MBNA America Bank, N.A. for 
proof of any contractual obligations regarding arbitration. None has been provided to 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to the Federal Debt Collections and Practices Act (FDCP A) the Defendant has 
disputed the debt and asked for Validation and Verification of the Debt. No Validation 
and Verification has been provided. 
The Defendant has requested in 2 letters (Exhibit 1% and 2) that the above attorney show 
proof that their firm truly does represent the above plaintiff. No proof has been furnished 
and none of the Defendant's questions have been answered or replied too. 
No Contract has been presented that makes for Defendant to enter into arbitration with 
Plaintiff. The arbitration forum presented is openly colluding with MBNA America 
Bank, N A in Violation of 18 USC 1961,1962 & 1864(a). 
Without a response and answers to the above requests as asked for by the Defendant in 
Exhibit 1, and 2, there has been no validation of the debt in question, no proof that the 
above attorney represents the plaintiff, and no contract that obligates the Defendant to 
arbitration. 
The Validation of the debt has not been established as requested by the Defendant and 
required by law, the Plaintiff and its Alleged Attorney has violated the Defendant's rights 
by not presenting the Defendant with the facts as stated in Utah Code—7007-106. 
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Without the Facts asked for by the Defendant, the Defendant cannot perfect a way for his 
defense. It may also show that the Plaintiff and the alleged Attorney may lack the proper 
venue to sue in this court. This would deny the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The defendant has never agreed to waive his right to meaningful access to due process 
by way of contract. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff has filed suit with this court listing false and misleading allegations 
regarding the agreement to arbitrate. Arbitration agreement is clearly defined in the Code 
under Rule 2 C and is requirement in order to establish the existence of a valid claim. 
Without first establishing the existence of this agreement any ruling rendered by the 
Arbitration Forum for either party would be void on its face for lack of personal and 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The courts have upheld that a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a dispute cannot be 
forced to do so. In addition it has been established that the party making the claim must 
show that the defendant in the claim was made aware of the arbitration agreement, and 
that they agreed to its provisions. Casteel v. Clear Channel Broad. Inc. 
Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be compelled or required to submit 
to arbitration any dispute he has not agreed to submit. A party who has not agreed to 
arbitrate a dispute cannot be forced to relinquish the right to trial. 
Further, under the first step in analysis to decide whether a dispute must be arbitrated 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a party may challenge the validity of an 
arbitration agreement under general contract principles. 9 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1 et seq.; See 
also In Re David's Supermarkets, Inc. 43 S.W.3d 94 (2001). In addition, the federal 
policy favoring arbitration does not apply to the determination of whether there is a valid 
agreement to arbitrate between the parties; instead ordinary contract principles determine 
who is bound. 9 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1 et seq.; Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 
F.3d 1069, opinion supplemental on denial of rehearing 303 F. 3d 453. 
Plaintiff claims that there was an alleged agreement to arbitrate. This would than be 
governed by provisions under the FAA. Even under FAA, there must be evidence of a 
valid agreement. Courts are clear in upholding an agreement to arbitrate must be clear 
to both parties. Otherwise, the legislative intent ofarbitration is abused and devalued. In 
Stout v. Byrider, 50 F.Supp.2d 733, affirmed 228 F.3d 709, the court held that arbitration 
is a matter of contract, and thus, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate any claims he or 
she did not agree to arbitrate when making the contract. In the case at hand, Defendant 
never agreed to arbitration. Defendant never received any agreement or contract, or 
information regarding an arbitration clause. 
In the case of Badie v. Bank of America, The United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stressed that "arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration Act("F. A. A.")] is a 
matter of consent, not coercion." Allied-Bruce Terminex Co. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 
265, 270; First Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 55-56; Volt Info. 
Sciences. Inc. v. Board of Trustees (1998) 489 U. S. 468,478, See also AT&T Tech. Inc. 
v. Communications Worker (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648 ("[a] party cannot be required to 
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit..."). 
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The Bankers and the Management Lawyers both tout the general policy favoring the use 
of arbitration. But the Court of Appeal was plainly correct in the Badie case when it held 
that the FA. A. does not establish a presumption that a valid arbitration agreement exists-
it only favors arbitration after the fact has been established. See First Options of Chicago 
v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. at 943-44 ("arbitration is simply a matter of contract between 
the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes-but only those disputes- that the parties 
have agreed to submit to arbitration/') In fact, the party seeking to compel arbitration 
bears the burden of showing that the other party waived their right to go to court 
See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Climes. Inc. (7th Cir. 1997)121 F. 3d 1126.1126. 
On this basis it is reasonable to assume that Defendant was not notified of his right to 
opt out of this provision with out impunity. 
WHEREFORE, there is no consent or agreement on the part of Defendant to arbitrate, 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Plaintiff's petition be dismissed. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned party hereby certifies that on tins date a copy of the foregoing document 
was sent by Certified Mail to Plaintiffs Alleged Attorney. 
R. Bradley Neff 
< ^ H > D e c l 1 } , * ^ 
Certified Mail # H < ^ ~ / ^O-QT^V-Oyi^ - SjrfQ 
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r(^e*UhM i 
J ^ ^ N ^ P C . Certified Mail* 7004-1350-0002-0373-8438 
9730 South 700 East, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 1128 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1128 October 25, 2004 
To Whom It May Concern: 
You are in receipt ofa notice under the authcdtv rfThe Fair Debt Collections and 
Pntittttrta regarding your Letter dated October 12,2004 and your file number, jfcfc 
£20&4 dient: MBNA AMERICA BANK, N. A. 
It is not now, nor has it ever been my intention to avoid paying any obligation that I 
lawfully owe. In order that I can make arrangements to pay an obligation which I may 
owe, please document and verify the "debt" by complying in good faith with this request 
for Validation and notice that I dispute part, or all of the alleged debt. 
1. Pleaae furnish a ooov of me ftrttiftlfl wmiumy mrtf ™*"*i"ft ™y • n A ! """fry 
number to prevent identity theft and state under pjBOAlty_oXp^ rjujjtr^ yc)urclie« 
named above is currently the holder in due course of the promissory note and will 
produce the original for my own and a judge's inspection should there be a trial to 
contest these matters. 
2. Pleaae produce th« account and general ledger statement showing the M 
accounting of the alleged debt that you are now attempting to collect. 
3. Please identify by name sjad sddress all persons, corporations, associations, or any 
other parties having an interest in legal proceedings regarding the alleged debt. 
4. Please verify under penalty of periurv. that as a debt collector, vou have not 
purchased evidence of debt and are proceeding with collection activity in the 
name of the original maker of the note. 
5. Pi««« verify up/jef penalty of ptfjurv that vou know and understand that certain 
clauses fo * J***™** nf mAhHuon, mieh §g * go-called, fonim selection clause, are 
unenforceable unless the party to whom the contract is extended could have 
rejected the clause without impunity. 
6. PU—» verify wfar p»*tf fry of periurv that vou know and understand that credit 
card contracts are a series of continuing offers to contract and as such are non-
transferable to other parties legally. 
7. Please provide verification from the stated creditor, MBNA AMERICA BANK, 
N. A. that you are authorised to act for them and have been given a Power of 
Attorney for such. 
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*. Please verify that you know and understand thai comactmg me agak after receipt 
of this notice without providing procedurally proper validation of the debt 
constitutes the use of interstate communications (U.S. Postal Service) in a scheme 
of fraud by advancing a writing, which you know ia false with the intention that 
others rdy on the written communications to their detriment. Also see Sec. 809 of 
theFDCPA. 
1 am stiliin dispute of this alleged "debt". 
vWiL— 
Donnwittiama 
Copy seat to: 
Consumer Reapotau Oasatar 
Fedwal Trade Commission 
Washington, D.C. 20580 
CERTIFIED MAIL* 7v^l3yMW2-0?73444? 
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November 9,2004 Certified Mail#70O4135OO0O2O3738421 
R Bradley NeTt PC. 
9730 South 700 East, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 1128 
Sandy, UTM09M12S 
To Whom It May Concern: 
You have not aniwnred my letter sent to you and dated Cxtober 25.2004.1 show that YOU 
received this letter on October 27,2004. The Letter you sent with the arbitration award 
doe* not Validate nor Verify the debit in question Before any payments can be arranged I 
must know that youtiuly do represent MBNA AmgfaBjakNA-
You have not complied with the Fair Debt Collections and Practices Act (FDCPA) in 
Sec. 80S [15 USC 16921} (IX and Sec. 809 [15 USC 1692g] (b), and possibly Sec. 812 
[15 USC 1692]] (a) (b). ftfe i f c t t i tidrt | fffl fa JMttt 
If you woayjfliwjs: the questions I sent you in my first letter, then I may be able to 
communicate with the right persons concerning the alleged debt in question. Your failure 
to do so has me concerned that you may be biding something or are the wrong persons to 
communicate too. Your answers tot he questions sent to you would demonstrate if you 
are the persons I need deal with. 
I do not have a soaHXi with you nor do I have a satiasi with Wolpoff and Abremson, 
LX.P. and Total Credit Recovery USA Group Inc. I have never agreed with MBNA 
AIIMOTM Bank N.A to Arbitration. Bv law. ? cannot be forced to Arbitration. 
I am entitled under Federal Law guidelines in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) and under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that I have a legal right to 
demaiidthecjrjginiicjaor^^ 
To prove the content of writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, record, or 
photograph, is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of 
Congress. 
FRCP-Rult 1003, Adriwfrflitypf W i t t t t t 
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question 
it naaj u us tfg mhBjticjty. nf fa prijinaj ™- (»in thu cfrcumstaacc'« w~'M ** "«ftir 
to admit the duplicate is lieu of the original. 
And again, in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Section 1-201(3) 
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WCC)Sjflml-2<M3) 
M A j a — t " meant the bargain of the parties in fact as found m their language or by 
implication firom other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or 
courteof performawttu provided in this Act (Section* 1-205 and 1-206). Whether an 
agreement has legal consequences it determined by the provisions of this Act, if 
applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts (Sections M03). (Compare "Contract".) 
S^jonJOl of the Fair Debt Collections and Prtctiees Act (FDCPA) states the 
Following: 
IttUSCKMfiq) 
(1) Tte collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense 
incidental to the principal obligation^ unlearn tuch amount \f expreaalv authorized 
hytheagf^jyv^^ntr ingtkW^Pffrm^^ 
Hojattract. pp payment, po ppgottoiom--cndofttQry, 
In Section W)9 of the FDCP A it state* that a jydgmsa muttbeVaUd. Ajudgmattonly 
happens in a Court of Lew. The Arbitration Award that you show clearly does not fell 
within tte pisimatfrt nf tta» FaAaral i iw An AihHrttinn Fnmm does not equal a Court of 
Law especially when it is held in another State. 
"Federal Law preempts state law on the issues of arbitrability " Three ValkvsMwu 
Water Dht. YE. RHutton C9* Cir. 1991) 925 R2d 1136. i/39."... a party who contests 
the making of a contract containing an arbitration proviaionc«nnQt be compelled to 
ubitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrete. Only a court can 
make that btifonT Three Vallevs Mun. Water DisL HiLELHiBBCg, at 1140/1141 
lMS£fcfclJDg«lt tUL^ The requirement is jurisdictional. 
Without a written agreement, the FAA does not apply. Further, there is no requirement 
under the F AA mandating that the jurisdictional defense of "no agreement to arbitrate" be 
raised within a particular period of time. 
The following questions cannot be answered unless you answer the questions in my 
Letter dated October 25,2004 in which you have received on October 27,2004. The 
questions t i t : 
1 -The interest accrual is calculated according to the de&uH provisions of said contract? 
2 - If the contract allows for collection fees to be included, how would I know if they are 
correct? 
3 - If the contract allows for Attorney's fees to be mchided, how would 1 know if they 
are correct? 
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t^^^Tl!^^item*l t^-o^^ss^componcttt. of .correct 
•o^uaraememaiieconw* without seetag the contract? 
7-Etc., etc., etc. 
w ? ^ ^ ^ ? ? ! i 5 I V e r e q u e $ t e A Iywftiltodoso,Th«IctnMsumethit V<»^n«thepetwli^tocommuirfc^ 
WUltams 
< 
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